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Abstract—This paper studies the evolution of social
power in influence networks with stubborn individuals.
Based on the Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics and the
reflected appraisal mechanism, two models are proposed
over issue sequences and over a single issue, respectively.
These models generalize the original DeGroot-Friedkin
(DF) model by including stubbornness. To the best of
our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to inves-
tigate the social power evolution of stubborn individuals
basing on the reflected appraisal mechanism. Properties
of equilibria and convergence are provided. We show
that the models have same equilibrium social power and
convergence property, where the equilibrium social power
depends only upon interpersonal influence and individuals’
stubbornness. Roughly speaking, more stubborn individual
has more equilibrium social power. Moreover, unlike the DF
model without stubbornness, we prove that for the models
with stubbornness, autocracy can never be achieved, while
democracy can be achieved under any network topology.
Keywords Opinion dynamics, influence networks, social
power, reflected appraisal, dynamical systems, mathe-
matical sociology
I. INTRODUCTION
Problem description and motivation: This paper
investigates the evolution of social power in influence
networks with stubborn individuals. Two models are
formulated over issue sequences and over a single issue,
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respectively. The first model incorporates the Friedkin-
Johnsen (FJ) opinion dynamics and the reflected ap-
praisal mechanism to characterize the process of opinion
change on each issue and evolution of social power
over issue sequences, respectively. The second model is
a variation of the first model, in which the processes
of opinion dynamics and reflected appraisal take place
on a single issue. In the DeGroot-Friedkin (DF) model,
the process of opinion dynamics is described by the
DeGroot model, where individuals are completely open
to interpersonal influence. However, it has been shown
by empirical evidence that the FJ model is more realistic
and predictive in modelling opinion changes. This paper
extends the original DF model by including stubborn-
ness. Rigorous analysis and numerical experiments are
provided for equilibria and convergence properties. We
aim to uncover the difference between the evolution of
social power in groups with and without stubbornness.
Literature review: The investigation of social net-
works has attracted much attention from applied math-
ematics, sociology, control theory and economics, etc.,
over the last several decades. Classic dynamic models
of interest concern on how individuals exchange and
integrate opinions on a certain issue [25], [26], including
the DeGroot model [7], [14], [6], the Abelson model [1],
the FJ model [11] and the Hegselmann-Krause model
[15], [20], to name but a few. In this literature, the
FJ model, which generalizes the DeGroot model by
introducing stubbornness, is particularly of interest, due
to its predictive ability in human-subject experiments [9],
[10], [12], [11]. Further investigations of the FJ model
include [13], [27], [24] and the references therein.
Recently, the evolution of social power, namely, the
amount of influence or relative control of individuals
during opinion discussion, has drawn considerable in-
terest. The study of social power dynamics was initiated
by Friedkin [8] with a mathematization of the psycho-
logical mechanism of reflected appraisal. A rigorous
mathematical model and dynamical system analysis was
provided by Jia et al. [18], known as the DF model,
which integrates, respectively, the DeGroot model and
the reflected appraisal to describe the opinion dynamics
on each issue and the social power evolution over issue
sequences. Empirical evidence in support of the reflected
2appraisal mechanism was provided in [10].
Several extensions and variations of the DF model
has been presented since its introduction. Jia et al. [17]
extended it to the case that the relative interaction matrix
is reducible. A single timesacle DF model was proposed
and investigated in [16], where reflected appraisal and
opinion dynamics take place on a single issue. A modi-
fied DF model was proposed in [28], where social power
is unpdated before opinion consensus. A novel stability
analysis method for nonlinear Markov chains formulated
on the DF model was provided in [2]. Chen et al. [5]
extended the DF model to the scenario where the relative
interaction matrix is switching and stochastic. In [29],
Ye et al. extended the DF model to the setting that the
relative interaction matrix is switching in a finite set, an
approach based on nonlinear contraction analysis [19]
was employed to address the convergence properties.
Contributions: This paper extends the DF model by
including stubbornness. First, we propose two models on
social power evolution of stubborn individuals over issue
sequences and over a single issue, respectively. These
models cover two prevalent scenarios in the practice.
That is, for specially designed groups, it is feasible or
necessary to appraise each member’s performance or
importance after discussion on each issue; for loosely
assembled or spontaneously arisen groups, discussion on
issues may be persistent and reflected appraisal may take
place after each opinion update.
Second, we study the properties of equilibria. We
prove that for the two models, equilibrium social power
is equivalent. Based on the equivalence, we derive the
condition for uniqueness of equilibrium social power
under general topology, and provide lower and upper
bounds for the equilibrium social power. Moreover,
we analyze the relationship between equilibrium so-
cial power and stubbornness, interpersonal influence,
respectively. A sufficient and necessary condition for the
existence of democratic equilibrium social power is also
provided. For the case that the influence network is star
topology, we analyze the uniqueness of the equilibrium
social power in the settings that the center node is
fully stubborn and partially stubborn, respectively. In the
former case, we prove that the center node occupies the
largest equilibrium social power, while the ordering of
the equilibrium social power of partially stubborn indi-
viduals is consistent with the ordering of their stubborn-
ness. In the later case, we show that individuals’ social
power at equilibrium increases as their stubbornness or
influence weights accorded by center node increase.
Third, we establish the convergence properties. For
the model over issue sequences, we prove that all its
trajectories globally converge to the unique equilibrium
exponentially fast. The convergence properties under star
topologies with fully stubborn and partially stubborn
center node are also provided, respectively. For the
model over a single issue, we prove that individuals’
social power globally exponentially converges to the
unique equilibrium if their stubborn levels are higher
than 1/2. Moreover, in the case that the relative interac-
tion matrix is doubly-stochastic and individuals are uni-
formly stubborn, we prove that individuals’ social power
globally exponentially converges to the democratic social
power structure. Finally, based on the simulation results
and the Chernoff bound, we provide a conjecture for the
uniqueness and global attractivity of the equilibrium.
Our investigation reveal some findings which are of
sociological interest. First, the equivalence of equilib-
rium social power implies that the reflected appraisal
mechanism is robust with respect to variations in the
time scales at which opinions and social power evolve.
Second, individuals will forget their initial social power
exponentially fast, and the equilibrium social power only
depends on interpersonal influence and stubbornness.
Third, the social power of stubborn individual can never
be 0, which means that stubbornness leads to social
power. Moreover, for individuals embedded in symmetric
influence networks or accorded same influence weights
by partially stubborn individuals, more stubbornness
leads to more social power. Finally, in groups con-
sisting of stubborn individuals, autocratic social power
never emerges, while democratic social power can be
achieved regardless of the network topology. From this
perspective, stubbornness enables groups to prevent the
emergence of autocracy and to achieve democracy.
Lastly, compared with our preliminary conference pa-
per [21], this article contains several results and updates
not found in [21]. First, we propose a new model on
the social power evolution of stubborn individuals over a
single issue, and analyze properties of equilibria and con-
vergence. Second, for the model over issue sequences,
we derive a milder condition for the uniqueness of equi-
librium social power, and provide convergence analysis,
which is not addressed in [21] except the case that the
influence network is doubly-stochastic and individuals
are homogeneous. Third, we discuss the properties of
the equilibrium social power and its relationship with
the influence network and individuals’ stubbornness.
Paper organization: In Section II, we propose the
DF model with stubbornness over issue sequences and
over a single issue, respectively. In Section III, properties
of the equilibrium social power is analyzed. In Section
IV, we establish the convergence properties. Simulations
and a conjecture are provided in Section V. Section VI
concludes the paper and all proofs are in Appendices.
Notations: Let 1n and In denote the n × 1 all-
ones vector and the n× n identity matrix, respectively.
ei denotes the i-th standard basis vector with proper
dimension. Given δ ∈ Rn, diag(δ) denotes a diagonal
3matrix with diagonal elements δ1, δ2, . . . , δn. The n-
simplex is denoted by ∆n={x ∈ R
n | x ≥ 0,1Tnx=1}.
Its interior is denoted by int∆n = {x ∈ R
n | x >
0,1Tnx = 1}. A nonnegative matrix is row-stochastic
(column-stochastic) if its row (column) sums are 1; it is
doubly-stochastic if both its row and column sums are 1.
The weighted digraph G(W ) associated to nonnegative
matrix W is defined as: the node set is {1, . . . , n}; there
is a directed edge (i, j) from nodes i to j if and only
if Wij > 0. G(W ) is a star topology if all its directed
edges are either from or to a center node. A strongly
connected component (SCC) of G(W ) is a maximal
strongly connected subgraph. A SCC is called sink SCC
if there exists no directed edge from this SCC to others.
II. MODELING
In this section, we propose two models describing the
social power evolution of stubborn individuals over issue
sequences and over a single issue, respectively.
A. The DF model with stubborn individuals over issue
sequences
Consider n≥ 2 individuals discussing a sequence of
issues s = 0, 1, 2, . . . in an influence network formu-
lated by weighted digraph G(C), where C is the row-
stochastic, zero-diagonal relative interaction matrix. Let
yi(s, k) ∈ R denote the opinion of individual i on issue s
at time k. θi ∈ [0, 1] denotes individual i’s susceptibility
to interpersonal influence, i.e., 1 − θi represents its
stubbornness to initial opinion. Assume that during the
discussion of issue s, the self-appraisal of individual i,
denoted by xi(s) ∈ [0, 1], is static, and each individual
forms its opinion according to the FJ model
yi(s, k + 1) = θi
n∑
j=1
Wij(s)yj(s, k) + (1 − θi)yi(s, 0).
Assume that Wii(s) = xi(s), and Wij(s) = (1 −
xi(s))Cij , i.e., individuals’ self-weights are equal to
their self-appraisals. Let y(s, k) and θ denote the vectors
of individuals’ opinions and susceptibilities, we have
y(s, k+1) = ΘW (x(s))y(s, k) + (In −Θ)y(s, 0), (1)
where Θ = diag(θ), x(s) ∈ ∆n, and W (x(s)) =
diag(x(s)) + (In − diag(x(s)))C.
Assumption 1 Suppose that every sink SCC of G(C)
has at least one stubborn individual, and θi < 1 if
x(0) = ei.
Assumption 1 ensures that the FJ opinion dynamics
converges on each issue. By Lemma III.1 in [21],
ΘW (x(s)) is strictly row-substochastic for any s ≥ 0
under Assumption 1. Hence, on each issue s, there holds
y(s,∞) = V (x(s))y(s, 0), (2)
where V (x(s)) = (In −ΘW (x(s)))
−1(In −Θ) is row-
stochastic.
Equation (2) implies that each individual’s opinion
converges to a convex combination of all individuals’
initial opinions. In other words, Vij(s) is the influence
of individual j’s initial opinion to individual i’s final
opinion on issue s. Consequently, (1/n)
∑n
i=1 Vij(s),
which represents individual j’s relative control on other
individuals’ final opinions, is individual j’s social power
exerted on issue s, as defined in [4]. According to
the reflected appraisal mechanism [8], individuals’ self-
appraisals on each issue are set equal to their social
power they exerted over prior issue. That is,
x(s+ 1) = V (x(s))T
1n
n
. (3)
Since V (x(s)) is row-stochastic, equation (3) ensures
that x(s + 1) ∈ ∆n.
Definition 1 (The DeGroot-Friedkin model with stub-
born individuals over issue sequences) Consider an
influence network with n ≥ 2 individuals discussing
a sequence of issues s = 0, 1, 2, . . . Suppose that
Assumption 1 holds. Let C and Θ=diag(θ1, θ2, . . . , θn)
be the row-stochastic, zero-diagonal relative interaction
matrix and the diagonal matrix representing individuals’
susceptibilities, respectively. Then, the DeGroot-Friedkin
model with stubborn individuals over issue sequences is
x(s + 1) = (In −Θ)(In −W (x(s))
TΘ)−1
1n
n
, (4)
where W (x(s))=diag(x(s)) + (In − diag(x(s)))C.
Define F : ∆n → ∆n as
F (x)=(In −Θ)(In −W (x)
TΘ)−1
1n
n
. (5)
Then, system (4) can be written as x(s+1) = F (x(s)).
System (4) generalized the original DF model to
the case that individuals are anchored to their initial
opinions during the discussion of each issue. Empirical
evidence supporting this generalization is provided in
[11], [10] and [9], which substantiate that the presence of
stubbornness is prevalent in human-subject experiments,
and the model including stubbornness is more predictive.
Note that if Θ = In, then system (4) is the original
DF model. Whereas, at the presence of stubbornness,
individuals’ final opinions on each issue depend not
only on the relative influence network, but also on their
stubbornness, and generally can not achieve consensus
[27]. This is different from the original DF model, in
which individuals’ social power can be captured by the
dominant left eigenvector of C under the assumption that
all sink SCCs of G(C) are aperiodic.
According to Definition 1, for any s > 0 and x(0) ∈
∆n, if θi = 1, then xi(s) ≡ 0; if θi = 0 for all i,
4then x(s)≡1n/n. For simplicity, we have the following
assumption.
Assumption 2 Suppose that θi < 1 for any i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, and there exists at least one individual j
with θj > 0.
Note that Assumption 2 implies Assumption 1.
Remark 1 In model (4) individual’s relative control
over the prior discussion is appraised by computing
(In − W (x(s))
TΘ)−1 and by averaging the columns
of V (x(s)); both steps are unrealistic for an individual
to perform in a large group because of information and
computational requirements. Here we propose a simple
distributed dynamical process by which individuals can
perceive their social power by using the local interper-
sonal influence information. Assume that each individual
knows the group size n, the susceptibilities of individuals
who accord interpersonal influence to it and the ac-
corded influence weights. At each issue s and time k, let
pi(s, k) denote the perceived social power of individual
i, W (s) = diag(x(s)) + (I − diag(x(s)))C denote the
influence matrix. Then, individual i perceives its social
power during the discussion of issue s according to
pi(s, k + 1) = (1− θi)
n∑
j=1
θjWji(s)pj(s, k)
1− θj
+
1− θi
n
.
That is,
p(s, k + 1) = W˜ (s)p(s, k) + (In −Θ)
1n
n
,
where W˜ (s) = (In − Θ)W (s)
TΘ(In − Θ)
−1, whose
spectral radius is strictly less than 1 under Assumption 2.
Hence, p(s,∞) = (In − Θ)(In −W (s)
TΘ)−11n/n =
x(s+ 1) for any p(s, 0) ∈ Rn.
B. The DF model with stubborn individuals over a single
issue
We now propose a variation of model (4), in which the
processes of reflected appraisal and opinion dynamics
take place on the same timescale. Consider n ≥ 2
individuals discussing a single issue on timescale k =
0, 1, 2, . . . according to the FJ model
y(k + 1) = ΘW (x(k))y(k) + (In −Θ)y(0), (6)
where W (x(k)) = diag(x(k)) + (In − diag(x(k)))C,
x(k) is the individuals’ social power, y(k) is the opinion
vector, Θ is the diagonal matrix describing individuals’
susceptibilities to interpersonal influence, and C is the
row-stochastic and zero-diagonal relative interaction ma-
trix. By equation (6), we have
y(k + 1) = V (k + 1)y(0), (7)
where V (k + 1) is row-stochastic, and satisfies V (k +
1) = ΘW (x(k))V (k) + In −Θ with V (0) = In.
Similarly, in equation (7), the i-th column of V (k+1)
is the relative control of individual i’s initial opinion onto
all others’ opinions at time k. Based on the reflected
appraisal mechanism, we suppose that each individual’s
self-appraisal at time k + 1 equals its social power at
time k, that is, x(k + 1) = V (k + 1)T1n/n.
Definition 2 (The DeGroot-Friedkin model with stub-
born individuals over a single issue) Consider an in-
fluence network with n ≥ 2 individuals discussing a
single issue over timescale k = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Let C and
Θ = diag(θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) be the row-stochastic, zero-
diagonal relative interaction matrix and the diagonal
matrix representing individuals’ susceptibilities, respec-
tively. Then, the DeGroot-Friedkin model with stubborn
individuals over a single issue is

V (k + 1) = ΘW (x(k))V (k) + In −Θ,
x(k + 1) =
V (k + 1)T1n
n
,
(8)
with W (x(k)) = diag(x(k)) + (In − diag(x(k)))C and
V (0) = In.
Remark 2 In the formulation of reflected appraisal
mechanism [8], both individual’s self-weights for current
opinions and stubbornness are postulated as the reflected
appraisals of its social power. In this paper, we focus
on the case that individual’s self-weights for its current
opinions equal to its manifested social power.
Let Γn = {W ∈ R
n×n | W ≥ 0,W1n = 1n}
denote the set of n × n row-stochastic real matrices.
Define G : Γn × ∆n → Γn × ∆n by G(V, x) =
(GV (V, x), Gx(V, x)) with GV (V, x) = ΘW (x)V +
In −Θ and Gx(V, x) = GV (V, x)
T
1n/n. Then, system
(8) can be expressed by{
V (k + 1) = GV (V (k), x(k)),
x(k + 1) = Gx(V (k), x(k)).
III. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
This section studies the properties of the equilibria of
models (4) and (8).
A. Equivalence of equilibrium social power
Since F (x) and G(V, x) are both continuous functions
from, respectively, ∆n and Γn × ∆n to themselves,
where ∆n and Γn×∆n are convex and compact subsets
of Banach space. Then, following the Schauder fixed
point theorem [3], i.e., every continuous function from
a convex compact subset of a Banach space to itself
has a fixed point, systems (4) and (8) have at least one
equilibrium, respectively.
5Lemma 1 (Equivalence of equilibrium social power)
Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, system (4) and (8)
have the same relative interaction matrix C and suscep-
tibility matrix Θ. Then, x∗ is an equilibrium of system (4)
if and only if for V ∗ = (In−ΘW (x
∗))−1(In−Θ) ∈ Γn,
(V ∗, x∗) is an equilibrium of system (8).
Lemma 1 implies that the reflected appraisal mecha-
nism is robust with respect to variations in the time scales
at which opinions and social power evolve. Moreover,
since non-stubborn individual has 0 equilibrium social
power in system (4), it also have 0 equilibrium social
power in system (8). Thus, we assume that Assumption 2
holds for model (8) in the sequel.
B. Properties of equilibrium social power with general
topology
Since systems (4) and (8) have same equilibrium
social power, we focus on equilibria of system (4). In
what follows, let θmin = minj θj , θave =
∑n
j=1 θj/n,
and θmax = maxj θj . Moreover, let Vf and Vp denote
the sets of individuals who are fully stubborn (θi = 0)
and partially stubborn (θi > 0), respectively. Without
loss of generality, assume Vf = {1, . . . , r} and Vp =
{r + 1, . . . , n} with r < n.
Lemma 2 (Properties of F (x)) For the map F : ∆n →
∆n defined by F (x) = (In−Θ)(In−W (x)
TΘ)−11n/n
with W (x) = diag(x) + (In− diag(x))C, the following
statements hold true:
(i) F is differentiable on int∆n and continuous on
∆n;
(ii) the Jacobian of F is ∂F/∂x = (In − Θ)(In −
W (x)TΘ)−1(In − C
T )Θ(In −Θ)
−1 diag(F (x));
(iii) for any x ∈ ∆n, (1− θi)/n ≤ Fi(x) ≤ (1 + ζ)/n,
where ζ = nθave − θmin.
Theorem 1 (Equilibrium social power with general
topology) Consider systems (4) and (8) with n ≥ 2 and
x(0) ∈ ∆n. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds, and C is
row-stochastic and zero-diagonal. Then, we have that:
(i) there exists at least one equilibrium of systems (4)
and (8), which satisfies
a) x∗ ∈ int∆n;
b) x∗i ≥ 1/n for i ∈ Vf, and x
∗
i = 1/n if and only
if Cji = 0 for any j ∈ Vp;
c) x∗i > (1 − θi)/n for i ∈ Vp, and x
∗
i < 1/n if
Cji = 0 for any j ∈ Vp;
d) maxi x
∗
i < 1/n+ θave.
(ii) the equilibrium social power x∗ is unique if θmax <n
n+ 2(1 + ζ)
with ζ = nθave − θmin.
Remark 3 In Theorem 1 we prove that if θmax <n
n+ 2(1 + ζ)
, then F (x) is contractive on ∆n, which
also implies that the equilibrium social power only
depends upon C and Θ. Since ζ < n − 1, then we
have
n
n+ 2(1 + ζ)
> 1/3, which implies that θmax <
n
n+ 2(1 + ζ)
is a milder restriction compared with that
proposed in [21]. Moreover, note that
n
n+ 2(1 + ζ)
=
1
1 + 2θave +
2
n
(1− θmin)
, that is, θmax <
n
n+ 2(1 + ζ)
is a restriction on the distribution of individuals’ stub-
bornness. For clarification, now consider a special case.
Suppose that r ≥ 1. Then, we have that ζ < n−r. Thus,
it follows that
n
n+ 2(1 + ζ)
>
1
1 + 2(1 + 1/n− r/n)
,
which tends to
1
1 + 2/n
as r/n approaches 1. That is,
θmax can be arbitrarily close to 1 in a large group where
the majority is fully stubborn.
Note that the relative interaction matrix C is just
required row-stochastic and zero-diagonal in Theorem
1, which means that the the autocratic social power (i.e.,
there is exactly one individual has social power 1, and
all others’ are 0) can never emerge in systems (4) and
(8), even though the initial social power is autocratic or
G(C) is star topology. This is a key difference between
models (4), (8) and the original DF model, in which
the autocratic social power can be achieved under both
irreducible and reducible influence networks [18], [17].
Corollary 1 (Properties of equilibrium social power)
Consider systems (4) and (8) with n ≥ 2 and x(0) ∈
∆n. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds, and C is row-
stochastic and zero-diagonal. Then the equilibrium so-
cial power of systems (4) and (8), i.e., x∗, satisfies:
(i) for any i ∈ Vf and j ∈ Vp, if Cki = Ckj holds for
any k ∈ Vp \ {j}, then x
∗
i > x
∗
j ;
(ii) for any i, j ∈ Vp, suppose that Cki = Ckj holds for
any k ∈ Vp \ {i, j} and Cij = Cji. Then x
∗
i < x
∗
j
holds if and only if θi > θj;
(iii) suppose that C is symmetric. Then for any i, j, if
θi > θj , then x
∗
i < x
∗
j .
Corollary 1 shows that if two individuals are accorded
same influence weights by partially stubborn individ-
uals, or the relative interaction matrix is symmetric,
then the more stubborn individual has more equilibrium
social power. In the DF model without stubbornness, the
democratic social power structure, i.e., x∗ = 1n/n, is
achieved only if the network is irreducible and doubly-
stochastic. Next, we show that for systems (4) and (8),
the democracy can be achieved even if the network is
neither doubly-stochastic nor irreducible.
Corollary 2 (Existence of democratic equilibrium so-
cial power) Consider system (4) and (8) with n ≥ 2
6and x(0) ∈ ∆n. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds, and
C is row-stochastic and zero-diagonal. Then, 1n/n is
an equilibrium of systems (4) and (8) if and only if
Θ(In−Θ)
−1
1n is a left eigenvector of C corresponding
to eigenvalue 1.
The proof of Corollary 2 can be readily obtained by
substituting x and F (x) for x∗ = 1n/n in equation (4).
C. Properties of equilibrium social power with star
topology
First, we consider the scenario where the center node
of G(C) belongs to Vf.
Theorem 2 (Equilibrium social power under star topol-
ogy with fully stubborn center node) Consider system
(4) and (8) with n ≥ 2 and x(0) ∈ ∆n. Suppose that
Assumption 2 holds, and C is row-stochastic and zero-
diagonal with G(C) being a star topology with center
node l satisfying θl = 0. Then, the equilibrium social
power of systems (4) and (8) is unique, and satisfies:
(i) x∗ ∈ int∆n;
(ii) x∗i = 1/n for i ∈ Vf \ {l};
(iii) x∗i =
n−
√
n2 − 4nθi(1 − θi)
2nθi
<
1
n
, and de-
creases with respect to θi for i ∈ Vp;
(iv) x∗l =
1
n
+
1
n
n∑
j=r+1
θj(1 − x
∗
j )
1− θjx∗j
>
1
n
.
Theorem 2 shows that for systems (4) and (8) under
star topology with fully stubborn center node, the center
node has the largest equilibrium social power, which
is strictly larger than 1/n. And other fully stubborn
individuals’ equilibrium social power is 1/n, while all
partially stubborn individuals’ equilibrium social power
is strictly less than 1/n. Moreover, the ordering of equi-
librium social power of partially stubborn individuals is
consistent with the ordering of their stubbornness. Now,
we consider the scenario where the center node of G(C)
belongs to Vp.
Theorem 3 (Equilibrium social power under star topol-
ogy with partially stubborn center node) Consider sys-
tems (4) and (8) with n ≥ 2 and x(0) ∈ ∆n. Suppose
that Assumption 2 holds, and C is row-stochastic and
zero-diagonal with G(C) being a star topology with
center node l satisfying 1 > θl > 0. Then,
(i) the equilibrium social power of systems (4) and (8)
has the following properties:
a) x∗ ∈ int∆n;
b) for i ∈ Vf, if Cli = 0, then x
∗
i = 1/n; otherwise,
x∗i > 1/n;
c) for i ∈ Vp \ {l}, if Cli = 0, then x
∗
i is unique,
x∗i =
n−
√
n2 − 4nθi(1− θi)
2nθi
, and decreases
with respect to θi.
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Fig. 1: 50 runs of trajectories of x(s) under different Θ.
(ii) Moreover, if there holds Cli = 0 for all i ∈ Vp\{l},
then the equilibrium social power of systems (4) and
(8) is unique, and satisfies:
a) x∗i =
n−
√
n2 − 4nθi(1− θi)
2nθi
, and decreases
with respect to θi for i ∈ Vp \ {l};
b) x∗l =
n−
√
n2 − 4nθl(1− θl)ξ∗
2nθl
;
c) x∗i =
1
n
+ (
ξ∗
n
− x∗l )Cli for i ∈ Vf,
where ξ∗ = n− r − n
∑
j∈Vp\{l}
x∗j .
Theorem 3 shows that all individuals have positive
equilibrium social power, while the partially stubborn
center does not necessarily have the largest equilibrium
social power. The following examples show that under
the same star topology with partially stubborn center
node, both fully stubborn individual and partially stub-
born individual (whether if it is center node or not)
can obtain the largest equilibrium social power, which
depends upon individuals’ stubbornness.
Numerical examples on star topology with partially
stubborn center node: Consider system (4) with n = 3.
Suppose that C = [0, 0.2, 0.8; 1, 0, 0; 1, 0, 0], i.e., indi-
vidual 1 is the center node. Then, under different settings
of Θ, we obtain the trajectories of x(s), shown in Fig.
(1). It is observed that in Fig. (1), the center node
1 occupies the largest equilibrium social power when
θ = (0.1, 0, 0.6)T , while the fully stubborn node and
partially stubborn node which are not center node can
also obtain largest equilibrium social power under the
same influence network but different settings of θ.
Corollary 3 (Ordering of equilibrium social power un-
der star topology with partially stubborn center node)
Consider systems (4) and (8) with n ≥ 2 and x(0) ∈
∆n. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds, and C is row-
stochastic and zero-diagonal with G(C) being a star
topology with center node l satisfying 1 > θl > 0.
Then, the equilibrium social power of systems (4) and
(8) satisfies:
7(i) for any i, j ∈ Vf, if Cli > Clj , then x
∗
i > x
∗
j ;
(ii) for any i ∈ Vf and j ∈ Vp \ {l}, if Cli = Clj , then
x∗i > x
∗
j ;
(iii) for any i, j ∈ Vp \ {l} with Cli = Clj , x
∗
i > x
∗
j if
and only if θi < θj;
(iv) for any i, j ∈ Vp \ {l} with θi = θj , x
∗
i > x
∗
j if and
only if Cli > Clj .
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
This section studies the convergence of systems (4)
and (8).
A. Convergence of the DF model with stubborn individ-
uals over issue sequences
Theorem 4 (Convergence with general topology) Con-
sider system (4) with n ≥ 2 and x(0) ∈ ∆n. Sup-
pose that Assumption 2 holds, and C is row-stochastic
and zero-diagonal. Let ζ = nθave − θmin. If θmax <n
n+ 2(1 + ζ)
, then all trajectories of system (4) con-
verge to the unique equilibrium social power x∗ char-
acterized in Theorem 1 exponentially fast.
In the proof of Theorem 1, we show that if θmax <
n
n+ 2(1 + ζ)
, F (x) is contractive on ∆n. Then the
exponential convergence of system (4) follows from
the Banach fixed point theorem. Next, we consider the
convergence of system (4) with star topology. By the
proof of Theorem 2, we have the following Corollary.
Corollary 4 (Convergence under star topology with
fully stubborn center node) Consider system (4) with
n ≥ 2 and x(0) ∈ ∆n. Suppose that Assumption 2
holds, and C is row-stochastic and zero-diagonal with
G(C) being a star topology with center node l satisfying
θl = 0. Then, all trajectories of system (4) exponentially
converge to the unique equilibrium social power x∗
characterized in Theorem 2.
Next we consider the case that the center node is
partially stubborn.
Theorem 5 (Convergence property under star topology
with partially stubborn center node) Consider system (4)
with n ≥ 2 and x(0) ∈ ∆n. Suppose that Assumption 2
holds, and C is row-stochastic and zero-diagonal with
G(C) being a star topology with center node l satisfying
1 > θl > 0. Then,
(i) for i ∈ Vp \{l}, if Cli = 0, then xi(s) exponentially
converges to x∗i =
n−
√
n2 − 4nθi(1− θi)
2nθi
;
(ii) moreover, if there holds Cli = 0 for all i ∈ Vp \ {l}
and
∑
j∈Vp/{l}
θj ≤ 4n/5− 1, then all trajectories
of system (4) exponentially converge to the equi-
librium social power x∗ characterized in statement
(ii) of Theorem 3.
B. Convergence of the DF model with stubborn individ-
uals over a single issue
First, we consider doubly-stochastic influence network
with uniformly stubborn individuals.
Lemma 3 (Convergence with doubly-stochastic topol-
ogy and uniform stubbornness) Consider system (8) with
n ≥ 2 and x(0) ∈ ∆n. Suppose that θi = θ with
θ ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, C is doubly-stochastic
and zero-diagonal. Then all trajectories of system (8)
exponentially converge to the democratic equilibrium
1n/n.
Since θi = θ and C is doubly-stochastic, we have
x(k + 1) = θx(k) + (1 − θ)1n/n. Note that θ ∈ (0, 1),
thus x(k) → 1n/n. It is clear that in system (8), if
V (k) converges, then x(k) converges. Let V ∈ Γn be
a row-stochastic matrix, and Vi denote the i-th column
of V . Let χ = [V T1 V
T
2 ... V
T
n ]
T denote the vector
by vectorizing V , then χ ∈ A = {x | x ∈ Rn
2
, x ≥
0,
∑n−1
i=0 xni+t = 1 for any t ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}}. Let ν =
[(1 − θ1)e
T
1 (1 − θ2)e
T
2 ...(1 − θn)e
T
n ]
T ∈ Rn
2
. Define
Gˆ : A → A by
Gˆ(x) = In ⊗ΘW (x)x + ν,
where x ∈ A, W (x) = diag(ω) + (In − diag(ω))C
with ω ∈ Rn and ωi = V
T
i 1n/n. Now, we present our
convergence result for system (8) with general topology.
Theorem 6 (Convergence with general topology) Con-
sider system (8) with n ≥ 2 and x(0) ∈ ∆n. Suppose
that Assumption 2 holds, and C is row-stochastic and
zero-diagonal. If θmax < 1/2, then, all trajectories of
system (8) converge to the unique equilibrium social
power x∗ characterized in Theorem 1 exponentially fast.
Note that even though systems (4) and (8) have the
same equilibrium social power, their trajectories may
be different. In the proof of Theorem 6, we show that
system (8) is contractive if θmax < 1/2. However,
this condition is not necessary. In next section, we will
propose a conjecture on the contractivity of systems (4)
and (8).
V. SIMULATIONS AND CONJECTURE
As we shown, the equilibrium social power of systems
(4) and (8) is unique if θmax <
n
n+ 2(1 + ζ)
. However,
for the general case, the uniqueness of equilibrium social
power of systems (4) and (8) is equivalent to that the
quadratic equations (In − C
TΘ)(In − Θ)
−1x − (In −
CT )Θ(In − Θ)
−1 diag(x)x = 1n/n has exactly one
solution in int∆n, which is difficult to prove due to the
entanglement of C and Θ. In this subsection, we shall
estimate the probability that systems (4) and (8) converge
to unique equilibrium social power for any initial social
power and matrix pair (C,Θ).
8Monte Carlo validation: Since systems (4) and (8)
have the same equilibrium social power, here we just fo-
cus on system (4). For given matrix pair (C,Θ), where C
is row-stochastic and zero-diagonal,Θ satisfies Assump-
tion 2, we randomly pick xˆ(0) and compute the final
social power xˆ∗ by running system (4). Let x ∈ ∆n be
a random variable representing the initial social power,
and x∗x denote the corresponding final social power of
system (4). Then, define pr(C,Θ) = Pr{J(x) = 0}
as the probability that system (4) converges to xˆ∗ with
initial social power x, where J : ∆n → R
n = x∗x − xˆ
∗
is a measurable performance function. Now, we can
estimate pr(C,Θ) as follows. First, we generate N
independent identically distributed random samples of
the initial social power x1, x2, . . . , xN , where N is a
positive integer. Second, define an indicator function
IJ,C,Θ : ∆n → {0, 1} by IJ,C,Θ(x) = 1 if J(x) = 0,
and 0 otherwise. Finally, we compute the empirical
probability as
pˆr(C,Θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
IJ,C,Θ(x
i).
Then, for any accuracy ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and confidence level
1− η ∈ (0, 1), by the Chernoff bound we have that
Pr{| pˆr(C,Θ)− pr(C,Θ) |< ǫ} ≥ 1− 2 exp(−2ǫ2N).
If there holds N ≥ log(2/η)/(2ǫ2), then we have 1 −
2 exp(−2ǫ2N) > 1 − η, that is, the probability that |
pˆr(C,Θ)− pr(C,Θ) |< ǫ is greater than 1− η. In [22],
the authors computed that for ǫ = η = 0.01, the Chernoff
bound is satisfied by N = 27000. That is to say, for
given (C,Θ), if system (4) converges to x∗
e1
for all 27000
samples of initial social power, we can say that for the
given C and Θ, with confidence level 99%, there is at
least 99% probability that system (4) converges to unique
equilibrium social power for any initial social power.
Similarly, consider random variable (C,Θ) where C
is row-stochastic and zero-diagonal, θi ∈ [0, 1) for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If there holds that for each of 27000
samples of matrix pairs, system (4) converges to same
equilibrium social power for all 27000 samples of initial
social power, then we can say that for any C and Θ sat-
isfying Assumption 2, with confidence level 99%, there
is at least 99% probability that system (4) converges to
unique equilibrium social power for any initial social
power.
Numerical examples on uniqueness and conver-
gence: Based on above discussion, we run 270002
experiments for systems (4) and (8) with randomly
generated initial social power xi, i ∈ {1, . . . , 27000}
for each randomly generated matrix pair (Cj ,Θj), j ∈
{1, . . . , 27000}. Figure 2 depicts the trajectories of 6
nodes for 100 initial social power with 3 matrix pairs.
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Fig. 2: The trajectories for 6 nodes of systems (4) and
(8) beginning at 100 samples of initial social power with
3 samples of matrix pairs (Ci,Θi). The solid lines and
dot lines dipict the trajectories of system (4) and (8),
respectively.
The experiments show that for systems (4) and (8) with
each of the 27000 samples of (C,Θ), the trajectories
beginning at all 27000 samples of initial social power
converge to the same equilibrium social power. There-
fore, our experiments establish the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1 Consider system (4) and (8) with n ≥ 2
and x(0) ∈ ∆n. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds, and
C is row-stochastic and zero-diagonal. Then, all trajec-
tories of systems (4) and (8) exponentially converge to
an unique equilibrium social power, which only depends
upon C and Θ.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated the evolution of social
power of stubborn individuals. Two models are proposed
to characterize the social power evolution over issue
sequences and over a single issue, respectively. Analyt-
ical and numerical results are provided. We prove that
the model over a single issue has the same equilibrium
social power with the model over issue sequences. Based
on this equivalence, uniqueness and properties of the
equilibrium social power are analyzed under different
settings of the influence network topology. Then, we
establish convergence of the equilibrium.
Our investigations reveal several features for social
power evolution of stubborn individuals. First, the re-
9flected appraisal mechanism is robust with respect to
variations in the time scales at which opinions and social
power evolve. Second, individuals will exponentially
forget their initial social power, and the equilibrium
social power only depends upon the relative interaction
matrix and their stubbornness. Third, individuals will
have positive equilibrium social power if they are stub-
born, and more stubbornness leads to more social power.
Finally, for an influence network in which all individuals
are stubborn, the autocratic social power structure never
emerges, while the democratic social power can be
achieved with any network topologies. Future works will
focus on the co-evolution of individuals’ stubbornness
with their social power.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Regarding necessity, suppose that x∗ ∈ ∆n is an
equilibrium of system (4). Then, by equation (4) we
have x∗ = (In − Θ)(In − W (x
∗)TΘ)−11n/n. Let
10
V ∗ = (In − ΘW (x
∗))−1(In − Θ), then V
∗ ∈ Γ and
x∗ = (V ∗)T1n/n. Since
ΘW (x∗)V ∗ + In −Θ
=(ΘW (x∗)+In−ΘW (x
∗))(In −ΘW (x
∗))−1(In−Θ)
=V ∗,
then (V ∗, x∗) is an equilibrium of system (8).
Regarding sufficiency, suppose that (V ∗, x∗) is an
equilibrium of system (8). By equation (8) we have
V ∗ = ΘW (x∗)V ∗ + In − Θ and x
∗ = (V ∗)T1n/n.
Note that under Assumption 1, I − ΘW (x∗) is nonsin-
gular, thus V ∗ = (In − ΘW (x
∗))−1(In − Θ). Then,
x∗ = (In −Θ)(In −W (x
∗)TΘ)−11n/n, which implies
that x∗ is an equilibrium of system (4).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Denote Λ(x) = In − W (x)
TΘ. Regarding (i), note
(In −W (x)
TΘ)−1 = Λ∗(x)/ det(Λ(x)), where Λ∗(x)
is the adjoint matrix of Λ(x). Then,
Fi(x) =
(1− θi)
n× det(Λ(x))
n∑
k=1
Λ∗ik(x),
where det(Λ(x)) and Λ∗ik(x) are both analytic functions
of x. Since det(Λ(x)) 6= 0, Fi(x) is differentiable on
int∆n and continuous on ∆n for any i. That is, F (x)
is differentiable on int∆n and continuous on ∆n.
Regarding (ii), since θi < 1, (In − Θ)
−1 exists. By
(5) we obtain (In−W (x)
TΘ)(In−Θ)
−1F (x) = 1n/n.
Then, taking the derivatives of both sides, we get
(In −W (x)
TΘ)(In −Θ)
−1 ∂F
∂x
= (In − C
T )Θ(In −Θ)
−1 diag(F (x)).
Hence, ∂F/∂x = (In − Θ)(In − W (x)
TΘ)−1(In −
CT )Θ(In −Θ)
−1 diag(F (x)).
Regarding (iii), since Λ−1(x)(In −W (x)
TΘ) = In,
we have that
Λ−1ii (x)(1 − θixi)− θi(1− xi)
n∑
k=1
Λ−1ik (x)Cik = 1.
For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, since 1− θixi > 0, there holds
Λ−1ii (x)=
1 + θi(1 − xi)
∑n
k=1 Λ
−1
ik (x)Cik
1− θixi
≥1.
By F (x) = (In −Θ)Λ
−1(x)1n/n, we have that
Fi(x) ≥
1
n
(1− θi)Λ
−1
ii (x) ≥
1− θi
n
> 0.
On the other hand, by
∑n
k=1 Fk(x) = 1 there holds
Fi(x) = 1−
∑
k 6=i
Fk(x) ≤ 1−
∑
k 6=i
1− θk
n
=
1
n
+
1
n
∑
k 6=i
θk.
Since
∑
k 6=i θk ≤ nθave − θmin = ζ for any i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, we obtain Fi(x) ≤ (1 + ζ)/n.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Since the equilibrium social power of systems (4) and
(8) is equivalent, we just need to show that (i) and (ii)
hold for system (4). Regarding (i), by Lemma 2 we have
that Fi(x) ∈ (0, 1), i.e., x
∗ ∈ int∆n. According to the
definitions of Vf and Vp, we write
Θ =
[
0r×r 0
0 Θp
]
, and C =
[
Cf Cfp
Cpf Cp
]
.
Let x∗f ∈ R
r and x∗p ∈ R
n−r denote the equilibrium
social power vectors of fully stubborn and partially
stubborn individuals, respectively. Then, by equation (4),

x∗f =
1r
n
+CTpfΘp(In−r−Θp)
−1(In−r−diag(x
∗
p))x
∗
p,
(In−r − C
T
pΘp)(In−r−Θp)
−1x∗p =
1n−r
n
+
(In−r−C
T
p )Θp(In−r−Θp)
−1diag(x∗p)x
∗
p.
(9)
Since x∗ ∈ int∆n, we have diag(x
∗
p)x
∗
p > 0 and
(In−r − diag(x
∗
p))x
∗
p > 0, which imply that x
∗
i ≥ 1/n
and x∗j ≥ (1 − θj)/n+ θj(x
∗
j )
2 for any i ∈ Vf , j ∈ Vp.
Moreover, for i ∈ Vf , if Cji = 0 for all j ∈ Vp,
we have that x∗i = 1/n; otherwise, x
∗
i > 1/n. For
i ∈ Vp, if Cji = 0 for all j ∈ Vp, we have that
x∗i = (1−θi)/n+θi(x
∗
i )
2. Since x∗i < 1 and n ≥ 2, there
holds x∗i =
n−
√
n2 − 4nθi(1 − θi)
2nθi
<
1
n
. Finally,
maxi x
∗
i < 1/n+ θave follows from that x
∗ ∈ ∆n.
Regarding (ii), first, we show that F (x) is contractive
on ∆n if θmax <
n
n+ 2(1 + ζ)
. Since ‖(In −Θ)(In −
W (x)TΘ)−1‖1 = 1and ‖In − C
T ‖1 = 2, we have
‖∂F/∂x‖1 ≤2‖Θ(In −Θ)
−1‖1‖ diag(F (x))‖1
=
2θmax
1− θmax
max
i
Fi(x).
Since maxi Fi(x) ≤ (1 + ζ)/n and θmax <
n
n+ 2(1 + ζ)
, we have
∥∥∥∥∂F∂x
∥∥∥∥
1
≤
2θmax
n(1− θmax)
(1 + ζ) < 1.
Denote κ =
2θmax(1 + ζ)
n(1− θmax)
. Now, following the mean
value inequality (Theorem 3.2.3, [23]), we have that for
any y, z ∈ int∆n, there holds
‖F (y)− F (z)‖1 ≤ sup
0≤t≤1
∥∥∥∥∥∂F∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=z+t(y−z)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
‖y − z‖1
≤ κ‖y − z‖1 < ‖y − z‖1,
i.e., F (x) is contractive on int∆n. Moreover, for any
y ∈ ∆n \ int∆n and z ∈ ∆n, since ∆n is compact,
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there exists a Cauchy sequence {yk}
∞
k=0, which satisfies
yk ∈ int∆n and limk→∞ yk = y. Therefore,
‖F (y)− F (z)‖1
=‖F ( lim
k→∞
yk)− F (z)‖1
≤ lim
k→∞
sup
0≤t≤1
∥∥∥∥∥∂F∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=z+t(yk−z)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
‖yk − z‖1
≤κ lim
k→∞
‖yk − z‖1 = κ‖y − z‖1 < ‖y − z‖1.
Similarly, for any y, z ∈ ∆n \ int∆n, there holds
‖F (y)− F (z)‖1 ≤ κ‖y − z‖1 < ‖y − z‖1. That is, for
any y, z ∈ ∆n, there holds ‖F (y)−F (z)‖1 < ‖y−z‖1.
Thus, F (x) is contractive on ∆n. Then the uniqueness
of x∗ follows from the Banach fixed point theorem.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Regarding (i), for any i ∈ Vf and j ∈ Vp, equation (9)
implies that
x∗i − x
∗
j =
θj
n
−θj(x
∗
j )
2+Cji
θj
1− θj
x∗j (1 − x
∗
j )
+ θj
∑
k∈Vp\{j}
Ckj
θk
1−θk
x∗k(1− x
∗
k).
Note that
∑
k∈Vp\{j}
Ckj
θk
1−θk
x∗k(1 − x
∗
k) =
1− θjxj
1− θj
x∗j −
1
n
. Then,
x∗i − x
∗
j =θj(
Cji(1−x
∗
j)
1− θj
x∗j+x
∗
j (
1−θjx
∗
j
1− θj
− x∗j ))>0,
Therefore, x∗i > x
∗
j .
Regarding (ii), for any i, j ∈ Vp, by equation (9),
x∗i − x
∗
j = θi(x
∗
i )
2−θj(x
∗
j )
2+
θj−θi
n
+Cji
θj(1− θi)
1−θj
x∗j(1− x
∗
j )−Cij
θi(1−θj)
1−θi
x∗i (1−x
∗
i )
+
∑
k∈Vp\{i,j}
Cki
θk(θj−θi)
1−θk
x∗k(1−x
∗
k).
Note that θi(x
∗
i )
2 − θj(x
∗
j )
2 = (θi − θj)(x
∗
i )
2 +
θj(x
∗
i − x
∗
j )(x
∗
i + x
∗
j ),
∑
k∈Vp\{i,j}
Cki
θk
1− θk
x∗k(1 −
x∗k) =
1− θix
∗
i
1− θi
x∗i −
1
n
− θjCijx
∗
j
1− x∗j
1− θj
, and
θjCjix
∗
j (1 − x
∗
j )
1− θi
1− θj
− θiCijx
∗
i (1 − x
∗
i )
1− θj
1− θi
=
Cij(θj(x
∗
j −x
∗
i )(1−x
∗
i −x
∗
j )
1− θi
1− θj
+(1− θiθj)x
∗
i (1−
x∗i )
θj − θi
(1− θi)(1− θj)
). Then, we obtain
(x∗i − x
∗
j )(1 − θj(x
∗
i + x
∗
j ) + θjCij(1 − x
∗
i − x
∗
j ))
=(θj − θi)(x
∗
i (
1− θix
∗
i
1− θi
− x∗i ) + Cij
x∗i (1− x
∗
i )
1− θi
),
where θi > θj and 1 − θix
∗
i > 1 − θi indicate that the
right hand side is negative. Moreover, since x∗i +x
∗
j < 1,
then 1− θj(x
∗
i + x
∗
j ) + θjCij(1− x
∗
i − x
∗
j ) > 0, which
implies that x∗i < x
∗
j .
Regarding (iii), for any i, j,
x
∗
i − x
∗
j − (θi(x
∗
i )
2 − θj(x
∗
j )
2)
=
θj−θi
n
+Cji
θj(1−θi)
1−θj
x
∗
j (1−x
∗
j )−Cij
θi(1−θj)
1−θi
x
∗
i (1−x
∗
i )
+(1−θi)
∑
k∈Vp\{i,j}
Cki
θkx
∗
k(1−x
∗
k)
1− θk
−(1−θj)
∑
k∈Vp\{i,j}
Ckj
θkx
∗
k(1−x
∗
k)
1− θk
Moreover, we have
(1−θi)
∑
k∈Vp\{i,j}
Cki
θkx
∗
k(1−x
∗
k)
1− θk
−(1−θj)
∑
k∈Vp\{i,j}
Ckj
θkx
∗
k(1−x
∗
k)
1− θk
= (θj − θi)
∑
k∈Vp\{i,j}
Cki
θkx
∗
k(1− x
∗
k)
1− θk
+ (1− θj)
∑
k∈Vp\{i,j}
(Cki − Ckj)
θkx
∗
k(1− x
∗
k)
1− θk
,
and
(1−θj)
∑
k∈Vp\{i,j}
(Cki−Ckj)
θkx
∗
k(1−x
∗
k)
1− θk
=
Cijθj(x
∗
i −x
∗
j)(1−x
∗
j−x
∗
i )+(x
∗
i −x
∗
j )(1−θj(x
∗
j+x
∗
i ))
+
θi−θj
1−θi
x∗i +
θj−θi
1−θi
(x∗i )
2+Cij
θi − θj
1− θi
x∗i (1−x
∗
i ).
Then it follows that
(x∗i − x
∗
j )Cijθj(1 − x
∗
j − x
∗
i )(
1 − θi
1− θj
− 1)
=(θj−θi)(
1
n
−
1−θix
∗
i
1− θi
x∗i +Cij
θjx
∗
i (1−x
∗
i )
1− θj
+
∑
k∈Vp\{i,j}
Cki
θkx
∗
k(1−x
∗
k)
1− θk
).
Since
1
n
−
1−θix
∗
i
1− θi
x∗i > 0, we obtain that x
∗
i < x
∗
j holds
if and only if θi > θj .
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
According to Lemma 1, we just need to show the
statements hold for system (4). Without loss of general-
ity, let node 1 be the center node. Then, Θ and C can
be written as
Θ =
[
0r×r 0
0 Θp
]
, and C =
[
Cf Cfp
Cpf 0
]
,
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where Θp = diag(θr+1, θr+2, ..., θn), and Cpf =
1n−re
T
1 with e1 being a r-dimensional vector whose
first element is 1 and others are 0. Let V (x) = (In −
ΘW (x))−1(In −Θ), we have
V (x)
=(In −Θdiag(x)−ΘC +Θdiag(x)C)
−1(In −Θ)
=
[
Ir 0
−Θp(In−r−diag(xp))Cpf In−r−Θpdiag(xp)
]−1
×
[
Ir 0
0 In−r−Θp
]
=
[
Ir 0
Vpf (x) Vp(x)
]
,
where xp = (xr+1, xr+2, ..., xn)
T , Vpf (x) = (In−r −
Θp diag(xp))
−1Θp(In−r − diag(xp))Cpf , and Vp(x) =
(In−r −Θp diag(xp))
−1(In−r −Θp). Therefore,
F (x)=
1
n
[
1r+e11
T
n−rV
′
Θp(In−r − diag(xp))1n−r
V
′
(In−r −Θp)1n−r
]
,
where V
′
= (In−r − Θp diag(xp))
−1. Note
that 1Tn−rV
′
Θp(In−r − diag(xp))1n−r =∑n
j=r+1
θj(1− xj)
1− θjxj
, thus we obtain that 1)
F1(x) =
1
n
+
∑n
j=r+1
θj(1− xj)
n(1− θjxj
); 2) Fi(x) =
1
n
for
i ∈ Vf \ {1}; 3) Fi(x) =
1− θi
n(1 − θixi)
for i ∈ Vp.
By Theorem 1, we have x∗i ∈ int∆n. Regarding (ii),
since Fi(x) = 1/n for i ∈ Vf \ {1}, then x
∗
i = 1/n for
any i ∈ Vf \{l}. Regarding (iii), for i ∈ Vp, we have that
Fi(x) = Fi(xi) =
1− θi
n(1− θixi)
. Since Fj(x) ≥ 1/n for
any j ∈ Vf, Fi(x) ∈ [0, 1 − r/n]. Next, we show that
Fi(xi) is contractive on [0, 1 − r/n]. For any x
′
i, x
′′
i ∈
[0, 1− r/n],
| Fi(x
′
i)− Fi(x
′′
i ) |=
θi(1− θi) | x
′
i − x
′′
i |
n(1− θix
′
i)(1− θix
′′
i )
≤
θi(1− θi)
n
| x
′
i − x
′′
i |
(1− θi(1− r/n))2
<| x
′
i − x
′′
i |,
in which
θi(1− θi)
n(1− θi(1− r/n))2
< 1 follows from the fact
that (n+
r(r − 2)
n
−1)θ2i−2(n−r−
1
2
)θi+n > 0 for any
0 < θi < 1. Therefore, Fi(xi) is contractive on [0, 1 −
r/n] for any i ∈ Vp. By the Banach fixed point theorem,
xi(s) globally converges to unique equilibrium for any
x(0) ∈ ∆n. In conclusion, for any i 6= l, xi(s) converges
to unique x∗i . Moreover, for any i ∈ Vp, by the proof of
Theorem 1, we obtain x∗i =
n−
√
n2 − 4nθi(1 − θi)
2nθi
.
Suppose that x∗i is non-decreasing with respect to θi.
Then, taking the derivative of x∗i with respect to θi, we
obtain
2nθi − 4nθ
2
i√
n2 − 4nθi(1− θi)
− n+
√
n2 − 4nθi(1 − θi) ≥ 0,
which indicates that n − 2θi −
√
n2 − 4nθi(1− θi) ≥
0. Since n − 2θi > 0, we have (n − 2θi)
2 ≥ n2 −
4nθi(1−θi), i.e., 1 ≥ n, which is a contradiction. Thus,
x∗i is decreasing with respect to θi. Regarding (iv), since
xl(s+ 1) = 1/n+
∑n
j=r+1
θj(1− xj(s))
n(1− θjxj(s))
, then xl(s)
globally converges to
1
n
+
∑n
j=r+1
θj(1 − x
∗
j )
n(1− θjx∗j )
>
1
n
.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Let βi = θi(1−xi) and γi = 1−θixi. Without loss of
generality, Let node r + 1 be the center node of G(C),
i.e., l = r + 1. Similarly, C can be written as
C =
[
0 Cfp
Cpf Cp
]
,
where Cpf = e1(Cl1, Cl2, ..., Clr), Cp = (1n−r −
e1)e
T
1 + e1(0, Cll+1, ..., Cln) with e1 being a (n − r)-
dimensional vector whose first element is 1 and others
are 0. Then,
V (x)
=
[
Ir×r 0
Vˆ −1Θp(In−r − diag(xp))Cpf Vˆ
−1(In−r −Θp)
]
,
where xp = (xr+1, xr+2, ..., xn)
T , Vˆ = In−r −
Θp diag(xp)−Θp(In−r − diag(xp))Cp. Therefore,
F (x)=
1
n
[
1r+C
T
pfΘp(In−r−diag(xp))(Vˆ
−1)T1n−r
(In−r −Θp)(Vˆ
−1)T1n−r
]
.
By column transformations, we obtain the first col-
umn of Vˆ −1 is
ϑ
α
, and the i-th column of Vˆ −1 is
ei
γi+r
+
ϑβr+1Cl r+i
αγr+i
for 2 ≤ i ≤ n − r, where ϑ =
(1,
βr+2
γr+2
,
βr+3
γr+3
, ...,
βn
γn
)T , α = γl−βl
∑
j∈Vp\{l}
Clj
βj
γj
.
Thus, we have that Fi(x) =
ξ(1 − θl)
nα
for i = l,
Fi(x) =
1
n
+ ξ
βlCli
nα
for any i ∈ Vf, and Fi(x) ==
1− θi
nγi
+ ξ
βlCli(1− θi)
nαγi
for any i ∈ Vp \ {l}, where
ξ = 1 +
∑
j∈Vp\{l}
βj
γj
.
Similarly, we only need to show that the equilibrium
social power of system (4) satisfies all statements. De-
note β∗i , γ
∗
i , α
∗ and ξ∗ as βi, γi, α and ξ corresponding
to x∗, respectively. Regarding (i), a) by Theorem 1,
we have x∗ ∈ int∆n. b) For i ∈ Vf, we have that
x∗i =
1
n
+ ξ∗
β∗l Cli
nα∗
. Then, if Cli = 0, x
∗
i =
1
n
.
Otherwise, x∗i >
1
n
follows from that α∗, ξ∗ and β∗l
are all positive. c) For i ∈ Vp \ {l}, if Cli = 0, we have
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that x∗i =
1− θi
n(1− θix∗i )
. Then, by the proof of Theorem
2 we have that x∗i =
n−
√
n2 − 4nθi(1− θi)
2nθi
and is
decreasing with respect to θi.
Regarding (ii), since Cli = 0 for any i ∈ Vp \ {l}, we
have that α(s) = γl(s) and α
∗ = γ∗l . a) For i ∈ Vp \{l},
since Cli = 0, by Theorem 2 xi(s) globally converges
to x∗i =
1− θi
n(1− θix∗i )
. b) Note that x∗l =
ξ∗(1 − θl)
nγ∗l
,
then x∗l =
n−
√
n2 − 4nθl(1− θl)ξ∗
2nθl
since x∗l < 1.
Moreover, for i ∈ Vp \ {l}, since Cli = 0, we have that
nx∗i =
1− θi
γ∗i
, which implies that
β∗i
γ∗i
= 1 −
1− θi
γ∗i
=
1 − nx∗i . Therefore, ξ
∗ = 1 +
∑
j∈Vp\{l}
β∗j /γ
∗
j = 1 +∑
j∈Vp\{l}
(1 − nx∗i ) = n − r − n
∑
j∈Vp\{l}
x∗j . Then,
the uniqueness of x∗l follows from the uniqueness of ξ
∗.
c) For i ∈ Vf, we have x
∗
i =
1
n
+
ξ∗(γ∗l − (1− θl))
nγ∗l
Cli.
Since x∗l =
ξ∗(1− θl)
nγ∗l
, we have x∗i =
1
n
+(
ξ∗
n
−x∗l )Cli.
Finally, the uniqueness of x∗i follows from the fact that
ξ∗ and x∗l are both unique.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
First, we show that the equilibrium social power of
system (4) satisfies all statements. Regarding (i), for any
i, j ∈ Vf, since α
∗, ξ∗ and β∗l are all positive, we have
that x∗i =
1
n
+ ξ∗
β∗l Cli
nα∗
>
1
n
+ ξ∗
β∗l Clj
nα∗
= x∗j if and
only if Cli > Clj .
Regarding (ii), For any i ∈ Vf and j ∈ Vp \ {l} with
Cli = Clj ,
x∗i − x
∗
j =
1
n
(1−
1− θj
γ∗j
) +
ξ∗β∗l Clj
nα∗
(1−
1− θj
γ∗j
)
=
1
n
(1 +
ξ∗β∗l Clj
nα∗
)(1 −
1− θj
γ∗j
).
Since 1 +
ξ∗β∗l Clj
nα∗
> 0 and 1−
1− θj
γ∗j
> 0, we obtain
that x∗i − x
∗
j > 0.
Regarding (iii), for any i, j ∈ Vp \{l} with Cli = Clj ,
x∗i − x
∗
j =
1
n
(1 + ξ∗
β∗l Cli
α∗
)(
1 − θi
γ∗i
−
1− θj
γ∗j
)
=
1− θj
n
(1 + ξ∗
β∗l Clj
α∗
)(
1
γ∗i
−
1
γ∗j
)
−
1
nγ∗i
(1 + ξ∗
β∗l Cli
α∗
)(θi − θj),
where the last equation follows from that Cli = Clj
and
θi
γ∗i
−
θj
γ∗j
=
1
γ∗i
(θi − θj) + θj(
1
γ∗i
−
1
γ∗j
). Note that
1− θj
n
(1+ξ∗
β∗l Clj
α∗
) = x∗jγ
∗
j and
1
nγ∗i
(1+ξ∗
β∗l Cli
α∗
) =
x∗i
1− θi
, thus, x∗i−x
∗
j = x
∗
jγ
∗
j (
1
γ∗i
−
1
γ∗j
)−
x∗i
1− θi
(θi−θj).
That is,
− x∗i
γ∗i
1− θi
(θi − θj) = γ
∗
i x
∗
i − γ
∗
j x
∗
j
=(x∗i − x
∗
j )(1− θj(x
∗
i + x
∗
j ))− (x
∗
i )
2(θi − θj).
Therefore,
(x∗i −x
∗
j )(1 − θj(x
∗
i + x
∗
j ))=x
∗
i (x
∗
i −
γ∗i
1− θi
)(θi − θj).
Since x∗ ∈ int∆n and θi, θj < 1, we have that 1 −
θj(x
∗
i + x
∗
j ) > 0 and γ
∗
i /(1 − θi) > 1 > x
∗
i , which
means that x∗i > x
∗
j if and only if θi < θj .
Regarding (iv), for any i, j ∈ Vp \ {l} with θi = θj ,
we have that
x∗i − x
∗
j =
1− θi
n
((
1
γ∗i
−
1
γ∗j
) +
ξ∗β∗l
α∗
(
Cli
γ∗i
−
Clj
γ∗j
))
= x∗jγ
∗
j
1
γ∗i
− x∗j +
(1− θi)ξ
∗β∗l
nα∗γ∗i
(Cli − Clj).
Thus, it follows that
(x∗i − x
∗
j )(1 − θj(x
∗
i + x
∗
j ))=
(1 − θi)ξ
∗β∗l
nα∗
(Cli − Clj)
with
(1− θi)ξ
∗β∗l
nα∗
> 0, which means that x∗i > x
∗
j if
and only if Cli > Clj .
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
The proof of (i) follows from Theorem 2. Regarding
(ii), for i ∈ Vp \ {l}, Theorem 2 implies that xi(s)
converges to x∗i for any x(0) ∈ ∆n. Since ξ(s) =
1 +
∑
j∈Vp\{l}
(1 −
1− θj
γj(s)
) only depends on xj(s),
where j ∈ Vp \ {l}, thus, ξ(s) converges to ξ
∗ for
any x(0) ∈ ∆n. For i ∈ Vf, note that xi(s + 1) =
1
n
+
ξ(s)βl(s)Cli
nγl(s)
, which depends on ξ(s) and xl(s).
Therefore, xi(s) converges if xl(s) converges for any
x(0) ∈ ∆n. Since Fi(x) ≥ 1/n for i ∈ Vf and
Fi(x) ≥ (1 − θi)/n for i ∈ Vp, we have x(s) ∈
{x ∈ ∆n | (1 − θi)/n ≤ xi ≤ ai, i ∈ Vp} for
any s ≥ 1, where ai =
n− r
n
−
∑
j∈Vp\{i}
1− θj
n
.
Next, we show that Fl(x) =
1− θl
nγl
ξ is contractive on
{x ∈ ∆n | (1 − θi)/n ≤ xi ≤ ai, i ∈ Vp}. Consider
x
′
, x
′′
∈ {x ∈ ∆n | (1 − θi)/n ≤ xi ≤ ai, i ∈ Vp}, we
have that
| Fl(x
′
)− Fl(x
′′
) |=
1−θl
n
|
ξ
′
γ
′
l
−
ξ
′′
γ
′′
l
|
≤
1− θl
nγ
′
l
| ξ
′
− ξ
′′
| +ξ
′′ 1− θl
n
|
1
γ
′
l
−
1
γ
′′
l
| .
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On one hand,
| ξ
′
− ξ
′′
| =|
∑
j∈Vp\{l}
(
1− θj
γ
′′
j
−
1− θj
γ
′
j
) |
≤
∑
j∈Vp\{l}
(1− θj) |
1
γ
′
j
−
1
γ
′′
j
| .
Because aj < 1 − r/n for j ∈ Vp \ {l}, by Theorem 1,
we have that for any j ∈ Vp \ {l},
|
1
γ
′
j
−
1
γ
′′
j
|=
θj
γ
′
jγ
′′
j
|x
′
j−x
′′
j |≤
θj |x
′
j−x
′′
j |
(1−θj(1−r/n))2
.
Therefore, there holds
| ξ
′
− ξ
′′
|
≤
∑
j∈Vp\{l}
θj(1− θj)
(1− θj(1− r/n))2
| x
′
j − x
′′
j |
≤ max
j∈Vp\{l}
θj(1− θj)
(1− θj(1− r/n))2
∑
j∈Vp\{l}
| x
′
j − x
′′
j | .
On the other hand, for the center node,
|
1
γ
′
l
−
1
γ
′′
l
|=
θl
γ
′
lγ
′′
l
| x
′
l−x
′′
l |≤
θl
(1−θlal)2
| x
′
l−x
′′
l | .
Thus,
| Fl(x
′
)− Fl(x
′′
) |≤ ξ
′′ θl(1− θl)
n(1− θlal)2
| x
′
l − x
′′
l | +
1−θl
nγ
′
l
max
j∈Vp\{l}
θj(1− θj)
(1−θj(1− r/n))2
∑
j∈Vp\{l}
| x
′
j−x
′′
j | .
Denote λ by
max{
1−θl
nγ
′
l
max
j∈Vp\{l}
θj(1 − θj)
(1−θj(1−r/n))2
,
ξ
′′
θl(1− θl)
n(1−θlal)2
}.
Then, we have
| Fl(x
′
)− Fl(x
′′
) |
≤λ
∑
j∈Vp
| x
′
j − x
′′
j |≤ λ ‖ x
′
− x
′′
‖1 .
By the proof of Theorem 1, we have that
θj(1− θj)
(1−θj(1−r/n))2
< n for any j ∈ Vp \ {l},
i.e., maxj∈Vp\{l}
θj(1− θj)
(1−θj(1−r/n))2
< n.
Moreover, since
1−θl
γ
′
l
< 1, we have that
1−θl
nγ
′
l
maxj∈Vp\{l}
θj(1− θj)
(1−θj(1−r/n))2
< 1. Next,
we prove that
ξ
′′
θl(1− θl)
n(1−θlal)2
< 1 for any if
∑
j∈Vp\{l}
θj ≤
4n
5
− 1. Note that
ξ
′′
θl(1− θl)
n(1−θlal)2
< 1
means (na2l + ξ
′′
)θ2l − (2nal + ξ
′′
)θl + n > 0. That is,
(2nal+ξ
′′
)2−4n(na2l +ξ
′′
) < 0, which is equivalent to
that ξ
′′
< 4n(1−al) = 4(n−1)−4
∑
j∈Vp\{l}
θj . Since
ξ
′′
< 1 +
∑
j∈Vp\{l}
θj , and
∑
j∈Vp\{l}
θj ≤
4n
5
− 1,
we have that ξ
′′
< 4(n − 1) − 4
∑
j∈Vp\{l}
θj . In
conclusion, for any x
′
, x
′′
∈ {x ∈ ∆n | (1 − θi)/n ≤
xi ≤ ai, i ∈ Vp}, we have that | Fl(x
′
) − Fl(x
′′
) |≤
λ ‖ x
′
− x
′′
‖1<‖ x
′
− x
′′
‖1, which means Fl(x) is
contractive on {x ∈ ∆n | (1−θi)/n ≤ xi ≤ ai, i ∈ Vp}.
By the Banach fixed point theorem, we have xl(s)
converges for any x(0) ∈ ∆n, which implies that
x(s) globally converges to x∗ for any x(0) ∈ ∆n
exponentially fast.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
Since Gˆ(x) is an analytic function of x ∈ A, it is
differentiable on intA and continuous on A. Let B =
Θ(In − C)V and B
T
i be the i-th row of B. Then,
In⊗ΘW (ω)x =


ΘCV1
ΘCV2
...
ΘCVn

+


diag(ω)Θ(In − C)V1
diag(ω)Θ(In − C)V2
...
diag(ω)Θ(In − C)Vn

 .
Furthermore, since ∂ω/∂Vi = ei1
T
n/n, we obtain
∂(diag(ω)Θ(In−C)Vi)
∂Vi
=diag(ω)Θ(In−C)+
Bii
n
ei1
T
n ,
and
∂(diag(ω)Θ(In−C)Vj)
∂Vi
=
Bij
n
ei1
T
n
for any j 6= i, where Bij is the ij-th entry of B =
Θ(In − C)V . Hence,
∂(In ⊗ΘW (ω)x)
∂Vi
=


0n×n
0n×n
...
ΘC
...
0n×n


+


Bi1ei1
T
n/n
Bi2ei1
T
n/n
...
B
′
ii +Biiei1
T
n/n
...
Binei1
T
n/n


,
where B
′
ii = diag(ω)Θ(In − C). Consequently,
∂Gˆ/∂x = In ⊗ ΘW (ω) + H/n, where H = [B1 ⊗
(e11
T
n ) B2 ⊗ (e21
T
n ) ... Bn ⊗ (en1
T
n )]. Note that∥∥∥∥∥∂Gˆ∂x
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ ‖ΘW (x)‖∞+
‖H‖∞
n
=θmax +max
i,j
| Bij | .
Since 0 ≤ Vij ≤ 1 and 0 ≤
∑n
k=1 CikVkj ≤ 1, we have
| Vij−
∑n
k=1 CikVkj |≤ Vij ≤ 1 if Vij ≥
∑n
k=1 CikVkj ,
and | Vij −
∑n
k=1 CikVkj |≤
∑n
k=1 CikVkj ≤ 1 if
Vij ≤
∑n
k=1 CikVkj . Thus, it follows that | Bij |=
θi | Vij −
∑n
k=1 CikVkj |≤ θmax. Therefore, we obtain
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that ∂Gˆ/∂x ≤ 2θmax < 1. Similar with the proof of
Theorem 1, we obtain that Gˆ(x) is contracitve on A.
Then, exponential convergence of system (8) follows
from the Banach fixed point theorem.
